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1former encroaches upon healthy time and the latter crowds out non-medical
expenditures as people age. Finally, we quantify the value of health as both
an investment and a consumption good. We show that the investment mo-
tive is about three times higher than the consumption motive during the early
20s, but decreases over the life-cycle until it disappears at retirement. In con-
trast, the consumption motive increases with age and surpasses the investment
motive during the mid 40s.
1 Introduction
To date, the literature on life-cycle economic behavior has largely been concerned
with savings and consumption motives, but it has paid relatively less attention to
the life-cycle motives for health-related behaviors and, particularly, expenditures on
medical care. Indeed, there is a vast literature that has attempted to better under-
stand whether and when consumers behave as bu⁄er stock or certainty equivalent
agents (e.g. Carroll (1997) and Gorinchas and Parker (2002)) as well as the extent
to which savings decisions are driven by precautionary motives (e.g. Gorinchas and
Parker (2002), Palumbo (1999), Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994)). Much of
the earlier literature on these topics has been elegantly discussed in Deaton (1992).
However, very little is known about the motives for expenditures on medical care
2within a life-cycle context. This is true despite the fact that medical expenditures
accounted for 13.9% of GDP in the US, 10.7% in Germany, 9.7% in Canada, and 7.6%
in the United Kingdom in 2001 (see Exhibit 1 of Reinhardt, Hussey and Anderson
(2004)). Moreover, in the US, it is estimated that 25% of medical expenditures by
Medicare occur in the last year of life, so that there is a steep increase in these expen-
ditures over the life-course (Hogan, Lunney, Gabel, and Lynn 2001). In this paper,
we attempt to ￿ll this void by investigating the life-cycle motives for expenditures
on medical care.
We concern ourselves with two tasks. The ￿rst is to calibrate a life-cycle model
of economic behavior with endogenous health accumulation and to use the calibrated
model to better understand how labor supply, consumption, health investment and
health interact over the life-course. We attempt to better understand how changes in
health status a⁄ect other aspects of economic behavior using a structural framework.
The second is to better understand how the motives for health investment change
over the life-course.
Two motives for health investment were discussed in Grossman (1972a). The ￿rst
is that individuals derive utility from being healthy. The second is that good health
enables individuals to supply more labor either to the labor market or at home.
The former reason is referred to as the ￿consumption motive￿and the latter as the
3￿investment motive.￿The relative importance of each of these motives will change
over an individual￿ s life and, in particular, as people age, health will gradually move
from an investment good to a consumption good. Indeed, for the young and healthy,
the marginal utility of good health is low and the number of years they still have
to live is high, and so for them, the consumption motive is low and the investment
motive is high. In contrast, for the old and frail, the opposite is true; their health
investment is primarily driven by the consumption motive. While this discussion is a
direct qualitative implication of the Grossman Model, little if anything is understood
about how the motives for and returns to health investment evolve over the life-course
in the quantitative sense. This is one of the ￿rst papers to shed light on this issue.
As a precursor to what is to follow, we summarize our results. First, we show
that the model can match the age pro￿les of key economic variables quite well.
In particular, we are able to match the decline in labor supply that occurs in the
50s, as well as the hump-shaped pro￿le of consumption. In both of these pro￿les,
health and health investment play important roles. Much of the decline in labor
supply is driven by declining health status. In addition, we show that much of the
decline in consumption (on non-medical items) that occurs later in the life-course
is driven by a rapid increase in medical expenditures that crowds out consumption
on other items. Second, we decompose the Euler equation for health investment
4to quantify the relative importance of the two motives for health investment. We
show that the investment motive is about three times higher than the consumption
motive during the early 20s, but decreases over the life-cycle until it disappears at
retirement. In contrast, the consumption motive increases with age and surpasses the
investment motive during the mid 40s. The driving force underlying the age-pro￿le
of the consumption motive is a decreasing marginal utility of health.
Our paper contributes to and bridges the gap between two literatures within
economics. The ￿rst is the literature on the theory and, subsequently, the econo-
metric estimation of models of health investment. The theoretical literature began
with Grossman (1972a) but, since then, has grown substantially, with many authors
such as Muurinen (1982) and Picone, Uribe and Wilson (1998) generalizing Gross-
man￿ s original work. For a comprehensive discussion of these developments, we refer
the reader to Grossman (1999). Accompanying these theoretical developments has
been empirical work that has attempted to structurally estimate the parameters of
Grossman￿ s original model. While the later attempts by Wagsta⁄(1993) have proven
more successful than the earlier attempts by Wagsta⁄(1986) and Grossman (1972b),
no attempt has proven entirely satisfactory. We believe that the reason for this is
that, as pointed out by Wagsta⁄ (1993), previous attempts have largely relied on
approximations of the Euler equation for health investment that do not adequately
5account for the dynamics inherent in the health investment decision. By avoiding
any linearizations of the Euler equations, our work avoids these complications.
Second, we also contribute to a growing literature that has incorporated health
into computational models of life-cycle behavior. Many of these studies either in-
corporated health as an exogenous state variable (Rust and Phelan 1997; French
2005) or modeled health expenditure as exogenous shocks (Palumbo 1999; De Nardi,
French and Jones 2006; Jeske and Kitao 2009). In contrast, our model endogenizes
health investment, which allows us to answer the research questions proposed, and
provides a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of health investment on rele-
vant economic decisions.
This has spawned the most recent generation of papers that incorporates health
into computational life-cycle models of behavior in which health is modeled as a
durable consumption good a la Grossman (1972a). For example, Hall and Jones
(2007) use a Grossman-type model to explain the recent increases in medical expen-
ditures in the US. Yogo (2008) also builds a model of health investment to investigate
the portfolio choice of retirees and argues that the large savings rate observed among
the elderly is the consequence of a large bequest motive and not precautionary as
others (e.g., Palumbo 1999) have argued. Neither paper would have been able to
make its conclusions without an endogenous health stock.
6Our paper ￿ts into this strand of the literature. However, there are notable di⁄er-
ences. We investigate the life-cycle motives for health investment and its interaction
with labor supply. While Hall and Jones (2007) investigate the evolution of medical
expenses over time, they do not do so over the life-course nor do they consider labor
supply. Although Yogo (2008) focuses on life-cycle behavior of retirees￿consumption
and portfolio choice with endogenous health investment, he does not consider labor
supply. Finally, because we remain true to Grossman￿ s original framework, we are
also able to advance much of the literature on the estimation of models of health
investment that was started by Michael Grossman and Adam Wagsta⁄.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 describes the life-cycle pro￿les of income, hours worked, medical expendi-
tures and health status constructed from the PSID and the MEPS. Section 4 presents
the parameterization of the model. Section 5 presents the life-cycle pro￿les generated
from our benchmark model. Section 6 shows the decomposition of the consumption
and investment motives. Section 7 conducts the sensitivity analysis for some key
parameters in the model. Section 8 concludes.
72 Model
This section describes a life-cycle model with endogenous health accumulation. In
this model, an individual lives at most J periods. For each age j ￿ J; the conditional
probability of surviving from age j ￿1 to j is denoted by ’j 2 (0;1). Notice that we
have ’0 = 1 and ’J+1 = 0. The survival probability f’jgJ
j=1 is treated as exogenously
given.
2.1 Preferences
An individual derives utility from consumption, leisure and health. She maximizes












where ￿ denotes the subjective discount factor, c consumption, l leisure, and h health













Motivated by the real business cycle literature such as Cooley and Prescott (1995),
we assume that the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is
8one. The parameter ￿ measures the weight of consumption. The elasticity of sub-
stitution between consumption and health is 1
1￿ . The parameter ￿ measures the
relative importance of the consumption-leisure combination in the utility function.
The parameter ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
2.2 Budget Constraints
Each period this individual is endowed with one unit of non-sleeping time. She splits
the time among working (n), enjoying leisure (l), and being sick(s). Therefore, we
have the following time allocation equation
nj + lj + sj = 1; for 1 ￿ j ￿ J (3)





where Q is the scale factor and ￿ measures the sensitivity of sick time to health.
Notice that in contrast to recent structural work that incorporates endogenous health
accumulation (e.g., Suen 2006, Feng 2008), in our model health does not directly
a⁄ect labor productivity and/or survival probability. Allowing health to impact the
9allocation of time but not labor productivity is consistent with Grossman (1972a),
who says, ￿Health capital di⁄ers from other forms of human capital...a person￿ s stock
of knowledge a⁄ects his market and non-market productivity, while his stock of health
determines the total amount of time he can spend producing money earnings and
commodities.￿
This individual works until an exogenously given mandatory retirement age jR.
She di⁄ers in her labor productivity due to di⁄erences in age. We use "j to denote
her e¢ ciency unit at age j. Let w be the wage rate and r be the rate of return on
asset holdings. Accordingly, w"jnj is age-j labor income. At age j she faces the
following budget constraint
cj + mj + aj ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ss)w"jnj + (1 + r)aj￿1; for j < jR (5)
where mj is health investment in goods, aj is asset holding, and ￿ss is the Social
Security tax rate.
Once the individual is retired, she receives Social Security bene￿ts denoted by b.
Following Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995), we model the Social Security
system in a simple way. The Social Security bene￿ts are calculated to be a fraction






￿ is referred to as the replacement ratio. The only role that government plays in
this economy is to administer the Social Security system. An age-j retiree faces the
following budget constraint
cj + mj + aj ￿ b + (1 + r)aj￿1 + T;8j ￿ jR (6)
We assume that agents are not allowed to borrow so that
aj ￿ 0 for 1 ￿ j ￿ J:
Finally, there is no annuity market.
112.3 Health Investment
Following Grossman (1972a), we assume that the individual has to invest in goods
to produce health. The accumulation of health across ages is given by
hj+1 = (1 ￿ ￿hj)hj + Bm
￿ (7)
where ￿hj is the age-dependent depreciation rate of health stock, B measures the
productivity of medical care technology, and ￿ represents the return to scale for
health investment.
We assume that the age-dependent depreciation rate of health stock ￿hj takes the
form
￿hj =
exp(a0 + a1j + a2j2)
1 + exp(a0 + a1j + a2j2)
: (8)
This functional form guarantees that ￿hj 2 (0;1) and (given suitable values for a1
and a2) increases as the individual ages.
2.4 Individual￿ s Problem
At age j, this individual solves a dynamic programming problem. The state space
at the beginning of age j is described by a vector (aj￿1;hj), where aj￿1 is the asset
holding at the beginning of age j, and hj is health status at age j. Let Vj(aj￿1;hj)
12denote the value function at age j given the state vector (aj￿1;hj). The Bellman
equation is then given by
Vj(aj￿1;hj) = max
cj;mj;aj;lj;;nj
fU(cj;lj;hjg + ￿’j+1EjVj+1(aj;hj+1)g (9)
subject to
cj + mj + aj ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ss)w"jnj + (1 + r)aj￿1;8j < jR
cj + mj + aj ￿ b + (1 + r)aj￿1;8jR ￿ j ￿ J
hj+1 = (1 ￿ ￿hj)hj + Bm
￿
j;8j
nj + lj + sj = 1;8j
aj ￿ 0;8j
and the usual non-negativity constraints.
3 The Data
We employ data from two sources. The ￿rst is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), which we use to construct life-cycle pro￿les for income, hours worked and
health status. The second is the Medical Expenditure Survey (MEPS), which we
13use to construct life-cycle pro￿les for medical expenditures.
3.1 Panel Study of Income Dynamics
Our PSID sample spans the years 1968 to 2005. The PSID contains an over-sample
of economically disadvantaged people called the Survey of Economic Opportunities
(SEO). We follow Lillard and Willis (1978) and drop the SEO due to endogenous
selection. Doing this also makes the data more nationally representative. Our la-
bor income measure includes any income from farms, businesses, wages, roomers,
bonuses, overtime, commissions, professional practice and market gardening. This
is the same income measure used by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). Our measure of
hours worked is the total number of hours worked in the entire year. Our health
status measure is a self-reported categorical variable in which the respondent reports
that her health is in one of ￿ve states: excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor. While
these data can be criticized as being subjective, Smith (2003) and Baker, Stabile and
Deri (2004) have shown that they are strongly correlated with both morbidity and
mortality. In addition, Bound (1991) has shown that they hold up quite well against
other health measures in analyses of retirement behavior. Finally, in a quantitative
study of life-cycle behavior such as this, they have the desirable quality that they
change over the life-course and that they succinctly summarize morbidity. A battery
14of indicators of speci￿c medical conditions such as arthritis, diabetes, heart disease,
hypertension, etc. would not do this. For the purposes of this study, we map the
health variable into a binary variable in which a person is either healthy (self-rated
health is either excellent, very good or good) or a person is unhealthy (self-rated
health is either fair or poor). This is the standard way of partitioning this health
variable in the literature.
Figures 1 through 3 show the life-cycle pro￿le of income, hours and health. These
calculations were made by estimating linear ￿xed e⁄ects regressions of the outcomes
on a set of age dummies on the sub-sample of men between ages 25 and 75. Because
we estimated the individual ￿xed e⁄ects, our estimates are not tainted by heterogene-
ity across individuals (and, by implication, cohorts). Each ￿gure plots the estimated
coe¢ cients on the dummy variables. Figure 1 shows the income pro￿le (in 2004 dol-
lars). The ￿gure shows a hump-shape with a peak at about 60K in the early 50s. A
major source of this decline is early retirements. This can be seen in Figure 2, which
plots yearly hours worked. Hours worked are pretty steady at just over 40 per week
until about the mid 50s when they start to decline quite rapidly. Figure 3 shows the
pro￿le of health status. The ￿gure shows a steady decline in health. Approximately
95% of the population reported being healthy at age 25, and this declined to just
under 60% at age 75.




















Figure 1: Life-cycle pro￿le of labor income: PSID data













Figure 2: Life-cycle pro￿le of working hours: PSID data

























Figure 3: Life-cycle pro￿le of health status: PSID data
3.2 Medical Expenditure Survey
Our MEPS sample spans the years 2003-2006. As discussed in Kashihara and Carper
(2008), the MEPS measure of medical expenditures we employ includes ￿direct pay-
ments from all sources to hospitals, physicians, other health care providers (including
dental care) and pharmacies for services reported by respondents in the MEPS-HC.￿
Note that these expenditures include both out-of-pocket expenditures and expendi-
tures from the insurance company.
Figure 4 shows the life-cycle pro￿le of medical expenditures (in 2004 dollars).
The top pro￿le was calculated in the same way as the pro￿les in the three previous
￿gures. The bottom pro￿le was calculated using a quantile regression. Accordingly,
























Figure 4: Life-cycle pro￿le of medical expenditures: MEPS data
the top ￿gure reports the means and the bottom ￿gure reports the median by age.
Both pro￿les show an increasing and convex relationship with age. Perhaps not
surprisingly, we see that the medians are substantially below the means. This is
almost certainly the consequence of the notoriously fat tail in medical expenditure
data. Because we have a representative agent model, we will be matching the mean
pro￿le. However, the divergence between the medians and the means underscores
the need to incorporate heterogeneity into the existing framework in future research.
184 Calibration
We now outline the calibration of the model￿ s parameters. For the parameters that
are commonly used, we borrow from the literature. For those that are model-
speci￿c, we choose parameter values to minimize the distance between the labor
income pro￿les in the model and the data.1
4.1 Demographics
The model period is ￿ve years. An individual is assumed to be born at the real-time
age of 20. Therefore, the model period j = 1 corresponds to ages 20-24, j = 2
corresponds to ages 25-29, and so on. Death is certain after age J = 16, which
corresponds to ages 95-99. The conditional survival probabilities f’jgJ
j=1 are taken
from the US Life Tables 2002. Retirement is mandatory and occurs at age jR = 10,
which corresponds to ages 65-69. We take the age-e¢ ciency pro￿le f"jg
jR￿1
j=1 from
Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009), who construct it following Hansen (1993).
1The reason we choose to match the life-cycle labor income pro￿le is that it is the least health-
related among the other life-cycle pro￿les we want to study. In other words, we want to evaluate
the performance of the model on the health and health investment, and we also want to analyze the
interaction among health investment, consumption and labor supply. This consideration narrows
our choice of targets for calibration.
194.2 Preferences
We set the annual subjective time discount factor to be 0:971, which is in the range
of widely used values in the literature. Therefore, ￿ = (0:971)5. We choose a
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ￿ = 2, which is also a value widely used in the
literature (e.g., Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines (1995); Fernandez-Villaverde
and Krueger (2002)). Following Yogo (2008), we set the elasticity of substitution
between consumption and health to be 1
1￿  = 0:11; this implies   = ￿8. Since
the elasticity of substitution is near its lower bound of zero (which corresponds to
the extreme case of Leontief preferences), health and consumption are complements.
Since this is a key parameter, we will conduct a sensitivity analysis later.
4.3 Social Security
We set the Social Security tax rate to be 10.6%, which is the current rate for U.S.
Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI). The Social Security replacement ratio ￿
is set to be 30%.2
2Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (1995) ￿nd that the optimal Social Security replacement
ratio is 30%.
204.4 Factor Prices
The wage rate w is a normalization, which we set at 0.80. Since it is a normalization,
changing it to other values does not alter the results. We set the interest rate at 4%.
4.5 The Remaining Parameters
There are nine model-speci￿c parameters that remain: the weight of consumption in
this consumption-leisure combination (￿), the share of consumption-leisure composi-
tion in utility function (￿), the productivity of health accumulation technology (B),
the return to scale for health investment (￿), the scale factor of sick time (Q), the
elasticity of sick time to health (￿), and three parameters that determine the age-
dependent depreciation rate of health stock (a0;a1;a2). Our strategy is to choose
these parameter values so that the model can replicate, as close as possible, the life-
cycle disposable labor income pro￿le for working age (ages 20-64) people in the data.





w(1 ￿ ￿ss)"jnj ￿ income_dataj
w(1 ￿ ￿ss)"jnj
￿2
Since the model-generated labor income is on a di⁄erent scale than in the data,
we normalize the ￿rst period (ages 20-24) labor income data to match that in the























Figure 5: Life-cycle pro￿le of labor income: model vs. data
model. Figure 5 shows the life-cycle pro￿le of disposable labor income in both the
model and the data. The model matches the data very well. Particularly, the model
replicates the data almost perfectly in the ￿rst four periods. The deviation of the
model from the data is only 2.95% over all nine periods. We summarize our baseline
parameterization in Table 1.
5 Results
Using the parameter values from Table 1, we compute the model using standard
numerical methods. We report model-generated life-cycle pro￿les in Figure 6 to
Figure 10.
22Parameter Description Value Source
Demographics
J maximum life span 16 (95 ￿ 99)
jR mandatory retirement age 10 (65 ￿ 69)
f’jgJ
j=1 conditional survival probabilities Data US Life Table 2002
Preferences
￿ subjective discount factor (0:971)5
￿ CRRA coe¢ cient 2
  elasticity b/w cons. and health ￿8 Yogo (2008)
￿ share of c in c-leisure combination 0:34 calibrated
￿ share of cons-leisure com. in utility 0:80 calibrated
Health Accumulation
a0 dep. rate of health ￿4:00 calibrated
a1 dep. rate of health 0:05 calibrated
a2 dep. rate of health 0:00032 calibrated
B productivity of health technology 0:95 calibrated
￿ return to scale for health investment 0:8 calibrated
Sick Time
Q scale factor of sick time 0:07 calibrated




j=1 age-e¢ ciency pro￿le Conesa et al. (2009)
Social Security
￿ss Social Security tax rate 10:6% Data
￿ Social Security replacement ratio 30% Imrohoroglu et al. (1995)
Factor Prices
w wage rate 0:80
r interest rate 4%
Table 1: Parameters of the model





























Figure 6: Life-cycle pro￿le of medical expenditure: model
Figure 6 shows the life-cycle pro￿le of health investment (m). An interesting
pattern emerges. Health investment increases steadily until the mid 50s, at which
point it accelerates. From ages 55-59 to ages 80-85, it increases dramatically from
0.039 to 0.188 - a ￿ve-fold increase. However, after ages 85-89, the model predicts a
sharp decline in medical spending. This is a consequence of the assumption of certain
death after age 100 in the model. A forward-looking individual knows that she will
not need any health investment after age 100; therefore, she begins to disinvest in
health as the death date approaches.
Figure 7 shows the life-cycle pattern of health expenditure-labor income ratio. In
the data, this ratio is very low and stable until age 50, then it increases dramatically









































Figure 7: Life-cycle pro￿le of medical expenditure-income ratio: model vs. data
after age 55. The model captures this pattern very well. From ages 55-59 to ages
65-69, this ratio increases from 0.11 to 1.03 in the data, while the model predicts
that the health expenditure-labor income ratio increases from 0.09 to 0.84.
Health investment (in conjunction with depreciation) determines the evolution of
the health stock. Figure 8 displays the life-cycle pro￿le of health. The model can
produce decreasing health status over the life-cycle. However, in the model, as shown
in Figure 7, an individual tends to invest (relative to her labor income) more than
she does in the data from age 25 to age 45. Thus, the health stock is higher than
it is in the data. In contrast, the under-investment at the later age in the model
induces lower health stock compared to the data.


















Figure 8: Life-cycle pro￿le of health status: model
The model also does well in replicating other economic decisions over the life-
cycle. Figure 9 shows the life-cycle pro￿le of working hours. The model captures the
hump-shape of working hours. In the data, individuals devote about 34% of their
non-sleeping time to working at age 20-24. The fraction of working time increases to
its peak at ages 35-39, and it is quite stable until ages 45-59. It then decreases sharply
from about 38% at ages 45-49 to 22% at ages 60-64. In the model, the fraction of
working hours reaches the peak (about 38%) at ages 40-45. It then decreases by
11% to about 27% at ages 60-64. The health stock plays an important role in the
declining portion of the working hours pro￿le; as health status declines, sick time
increases over the life-cycle, which, in turn, encroaches upon a person￿ s ability to





























Figure 9: Life-cycle pro￿le of working hours: model
work. Our model predicts that from ages 45-49 to 60-64, the fraction of sick time
in the non-sleeping time increases from 7.85% to 10.80%, which accounts for about
28% of the decline in working hours in the model.
Figure 10 shows the life-cycle pro￿le of consumption (excluding medical expen-
diture) in the model. It also exhibits a hump-shape. Indeed, consumption declines
dramatically after ages 60-64 which is exactly when medical expenditure increases
precipitously. From ages 60-64 to ages 65-69, non-medical consumption decreases
by 22% from 0.406 to 0.317, while medical expenditure increases by about 80%, from
0.070 to 0.125. When we combine non-medical consumption and medical expendi-
ture, as in Figure 11, we see a smoother pro￿le. The main message that we obtain






















Figure 10: Life-cycle pro￿le of consumption: model
from these two graphs is that health investment ￿crowds out￿consumption at later
ages.
Finally, Figure 12 shows the time allocation between leisure and sick time. At
ages 20-24, leisure accounts for about 60% of non-sleeping time. Due to the hump-
shape of working hours (see Figure 9), it gradually decreases to around 54% at ages
40-45 after which it steadily increases to 62% at ages 60-64. Due to retirement at age
65, leisure increases dramatically to 87% of non-sleeping time at ages 65-69. After
age 70, it begins to decrease again as sick time accelerates and starts to dominate.
Finally, at the end of the life-course, sick time accounts for more than half of non-
sleeping time.




























Figure 11: Life-cycle pro￿le of total consumption: model






























Figure 12: Life-cycle pro￿le of sick time and leisure: model
29To summarize, our life-cycle model with endogenous health accumulation is able
to replicate life-cycle pro￿les from the MEPS and the PSID. First, it captures the
hump-shape of total consumption. Second, it captures the hump-shape of work-
ing hours. Third, and probably the most important, it captures the rising medical
expenditure-labor income ratio.
6 Motives for Health Investment
Based on the success of the model, we would like to use the model to quantify the rel-
ative importance of the consumption and investment motives for health investment.




















= 1 if j < jR
= 0 otherwise
(10)
where MPMj = B￿m
￿￿1
j is the marginal product of health investment at age j.
This equation provides the optimal rule for health investment. The marginal utility
of consumption at age j, on the left-hand side of the equation, represents the marginal
3Please refer to Appendix 1 for the derivation of this equation.
30cost of investing one additional unit of goods in health accumulation. The marginal
bene￿ts on the right-hand side consist of three terms. The ￿rst term, MPMj
@U
@hj+1;
shows that improvements in health due to investment will directly increase utility.
This is the ￿consumption￿motive for health investment. Better health tomorrow will
also raise labor income via a reduction in sick time. This is the ￿investment￿motive
for the health investment and is captured by the second term on the right-hand side




@hj+1. Note that since "j = 0 for age j ￿ jR,
the ￿investment￿motive disappears after retirement. Also, note that better health
tomorrow provides a more favorable starting point for future health accumulation.




@cj+1 on the right-hand side. This
is the ￿continuation value￿of health investment.
Figure 13 shows a decomposition of these three terms over the life-cycle. Top
graph in this ￿gure shows that the consumption motive, which is driven by the
marginal utility of health, increases with age as the health stock decreases. In middle
graph, the investment motive exhibits an interesting ￿U￿shape and disappears after
retirement. The ￿U￿shape is a result of an interaction of three factors: from ages 20-
24 to 60-64, marginal utility of consumption is decreasing ( @U
@cj+1); the age-e¢ ciency
pro￿le ("j+1) exhibits hump-shape; and the marginal bene￿t of reducing sick time
via better health (
@sj+1
@hj+1) is increasing. The continuation value in bottom graph also
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Figure 13: Decomposition of Euler equation for health
shows ￿U￿shape which is mainly a⁄ected by the marginal utility of consumption.
Noting that the continuation value term contains the present value of future
consumption and investment motives, we can further decompose health investment





































This equation states that the marginal bene￿t of one additional unit of goods invest-
ment in health at age j is the sum of the discounted accumulative ￿consumption￿
and ￿investment￿values from age j + 1 to the end of life J. The e⁄ective discount
32factor for t periods ahead of age j consists of three components: the subjective
time discount factor ￿
t, unconditional survival probability up to age j + t, and the
accumulation depreciation rate from age j to age j + t.
We show the accumulative ￿consumption￿and ￿investment￿motives in Figure
14. In this ￿gure, we see that the accumulative ￿investment￿motives decrease over
the life-cycle and disappear after retirement. In contrast, the accumulative ￿con-
sumption￿ motive increases with age. For the young, who are very healthy, the
marginal utility of health is extremely small. On the other hand, they are very ac-
tive in the labor market, and, therefore, the bene￿ts from working longer hours by
reducing sick time are important. Accordingly, the investment motive dominates the
consumption motive at this point in the life-cycle. Indeed, during the early 20s, the
investment motive is about three times higher than consumption motive. However,
as people age, their health deteriorates and the marginal utility of health increases.
Meanwhile, they face a shorter working life as they near retirement. Consequently,
the consumption motive surpasses the investment motive during the mid 40s. As an
individual enters her retirement, the investment motive disappears. Thus, her health
investment is a⁄ected only by the consumption motive, which in turn is mainly driven
by the rising marginal utility of health.












Figure 14: Decomposition of consumption and investment motive
7 Sensitivity Analysis
7.1 No Health Investment
As a counter-factual experiment, we would like to see what would happen if we shut
down health investment completely by setting B = 0. In Figure 15, we show the
life-cycle pro￿les of labor income, consumption, working hours and health status
of the model when there is no health investment. We see that labor income in
top left graph is signi￿cantly lower than that in the benchmark model. The main
reason is that, as shown in bottom left, working hours are much lower than in the
benchmark model. Since there is no health investment to compensate for the loss of























































































Figure 15: Life-cycle pro￿les of the model without health investment
health stock, health status is purely driven by natural depreciation. Bottom right
shows that health status in the model decreases much faster than that in the data.
As a function of health status, sick time thus increases much faster and crowds out
working time more severely. Lower health status also reduces consumption later in
life. This is partly due to having lower income but also to the complementarity
between health and consumption.
7.2 No Depreciation of Health
Figure 16 shows the life-cycle pro￿les of the model without depreciation of health
stock, i.e., ￿hj = 0;8j. In this scenario, an individual will optimally choose a ￿xed


























































































Figure 16: Life-cycle pro￿les of the model without depreciation of health
health stock that does not change over the life-cycle. Since health is complementary
to both consumption and leisure, better health induces higher consumption and
leisure throughout the life-cycle. Higher leisure crowds out working time, and so,
working hours are lower than in the benchmark model.
7.3 Elasticity of Health
The parameter   determines the elasticity of substitution between health and con-
sumption. The benchmark value that we chose (  = ￿8) implies that health is com-
plementary to both consumption and leisure. To assess sensitivity to this parameter,
we investigate what happens when   = ￿1 and   = 0. The implied elasticities of
36substitution associated with these parameters are 0.5 and 1 (the utility function thus
is Cobb-Douglas), respectively. Note that as   increases, health and consumption
become more substitutable.
Figure 17 shows the life-cycle pro￿les in each of the three cases. We see that as
health becomes substitutable with consumption, it does not change the shape of any
of the life-cycle pro￿les, but it does change the shape of the accumulative consump-
tion motive over the life-cycle. Indeed, in Figure 18 we see that the consumption
motive in the cases of   = ￿1 and   = 0 decreases over the life-cycle. The reason
is that as consumption decreases during old age, health decreases less than in the
benchmark case, since health is now a substitute for consumption. We can see this
in middle right graph in Figure 17. Therefore, the marginal utility of health later in
the life-cycle under both cases is much lower than that in the benchmark case. The
e⁄ective discount factor in equation (11) dominates, which causes the accumulative
consumption motive to decrease over the life-cycle.
7.4 Borrowing Constraints
In the benchmark model, we do not allow the individual to borrow. Here, we relax
this assumption. Figure 19 shows that without a borrowing constraint, an individual
borrows at the beginning of the life-cycle. She pays o⁄ all debts during the mid 30s






















































































































































Figure 17: Life-cycle pro￿les of di⁄erent elasticities of health





























Figure 18: Decomposition of accumulative consumption and investment motive: sen-
sitivity on  

















Figure 19: Life-cycle pro￿le of asset accumulation: borrowing constraint vs. non
borrowing constraint
and then begins to accumulate positive assets. Assets reach their peak just before
retirement. Towards the end of the life-cycle, the consumer dissaves to smooth
consumption. Compared to the benchmark case with a borrowing constraint, asset
holdings are lower at all ages.
The absence of a borrowing constraint does not signi￿cantly a⁄ect the life-cycle-
pro￿les. Figure 20 shows that the most signi￿cant e⁄ect is on working hours. Since
an individual can borrow to smooth consumption, she does not need to work as hard
during the early stage of the life-cycle. Working hours during the 20s are lower
than in the benchmark case. However, since she has to pay back debt, working hours
increase during mid-age. The borrowing ability does help in smoothing consumption,
































































































































































Figure 20: Life-cycle pro￿les of the economy with and without borrowing constraint
as in top middle graph of Figure 20. However, it does not a⁄ect the life-cycle pro￿les
of health status, health investment and the medical expenditure-labor income ratio
too much.
Allowing an individual to borrow freely also does not a⁄ect the consumption and
investment motives signi￿cantly except during the last three periods. This is because
the last period consumption in the ￿no borrowing constraint￿case is substantially
lower than that in the benchmark case. This reduces the marginal utility of health
(since
@(@u=@h)
@c > 0), which is a major term to determine the consumption motive.














Figure 21: Decomposition of consumption and investment motive: borrowing con-
straint vs. non-borrowing constraint
8 Conclusions
We studied the motives underlying the life-cycle behavior of health investment. To
accomplish this, we calibrated a standard model of health investment to match the
life-cycle pro￿le of labor income in the data. We found that the calibrated model ￿ts
key life-cycle pro￿les of consumption, working hours, health status and the medical
expenditure-labor income ratio very well. We then used the Euler equation for health
investment to decompose the motives for health investment into their consumption
and investment values. We found that the investment motive is about three times
higher than the consumption motive during the early 20s. It then steadily declines
41with age until retirement, when it is exactly zero. In contrast, the consumption
motive increases with age due to an increasing marginal utility of health. It surpasses
the investment motive during mid 40s.
Our model can be extended along several dimensions. First, we assume an exoge-
nous survival probability for the sake of computational simplicity. However, health
investment should a⁄ect survival probabilities. By allowing for an endogenous sur-
vival probability, we would incorporate another bene￿t of health investment. In the
Euler equation (10), this implies that health investment not only has ￿consumption￿
and ￿investment￿motives, but it also increases the e⁄ective discount factor by raising
’j+1. Second, we assume mandatory retirement at age 65 in the model. However, in
the data we do see some early retirements. How does health status a⁄ect an individ-
ual￿ s retirement decision? Extension of the model to make retirement an endogenous
decision would shed light on this question. Finally, we do not have uncertainty over
health status in the model. Adding uncertainty would allow us to analyze the e⁄ect
of health insurance (public or private) on individuals￿health investment. It will also
help us to better understand the distribution of health expenditures as we mentioned
in the data section.
With these extensions, this model provides a platform to carry out some very
important policy experiments. For example, we can analyze the welfare cost of the
42Medicare system. The bene￿ts of Medicare arise from facilitating risk-sharing. How-
ever, Medicare has costs. First, the Medicare tax distorts labor supply. Second, if
individuals know that they will be insured against health risk when they are older,
they may reduce their health investment when young, which, in turn, reduces average
health status, which, thus, incurs higher medical costs for society. Another inter-
esting policy experiment is to analyze the welfare gain (or loss) of a change from the
current system in the United States, which contains both employer-provided health
insurance along with public health insurance (such as Medicare and Medicaid) to
an alternative regime such as universal health care. Finally, one can also use this
framework to quantify the e⁄ects of tax-favorable health savings accounts (HSAs)
on savings, consumption and health investment. In this sense, we view this paper as
a ￿rst step in a more ambitious research agenda.
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9 Appendix 1: Derivation of Equation (10)

























where ￿j and ￿j are the associated Langrangian multipliers for the budget constraint








































48Substituting (12) and (13) into (14), we obtain equation (10).
49